The most fundamental alliance, the social pact, is the agreement to come together and form a people, a collectivity which, by definition, is more than just an aggregation of individual interests and wills. This act, in which the individual becomes a people, is “the true foundation of society” (59). The collective renunciation of the individual rights and freedoms that one has in the natural state and the transfer of these rights to the collective body creates, so to speak, a new “person”. The sovereign is thus born when free and equal people come together and agree to recreate themselves as a single body turned towards the good of all those who are considered together. Just as the individual will is oriented towards individual interests, the general will, once educated, is oriented towards the common good, understood and agreed collectively. This version of the social contract contains the idea of retorted duties: the sovereign is attached to the well-being of the individuals who constitute him and each individual is also attached to the well-being of the whole. In this context, it is not possible to give the individual the freedom to decide whether it is in his own interest to perform his duties towards the sovereign while enjoying the benefits of citizenship. They must be led to adapt to the general will, they must be “forced to be free” (64). The Economic and Social Agreement (also known as the ESA) was a tripartite social contract established within the framework of the Social Consultation Council (CPCS). It was closed on 19 October 1990 and signed for 1991 by the UGT, the CCP, the CIP and the government.

Although PAC and CGTP did not sign it, they played an active and committed role in the preparation and played a decisive role in the success of the negotiations. Although contractarians differ from individuals in their presentation of reasons, with some being attracted to more objectivist relationships (Scanlon 2013), most Hobbes follow the modeling of individual reasons as subjective, motivating internally or at least in agent relationship. This may be due to skepticism about moral reasons in general (Gauthier, 1986, Binmore 1998), a conviction of the overwhelming importance of personal interest in the social order (Hobbes 1651, Buchanan 2000 [1975], Brennan and Buchanan in 1985), a concern to take seriously the disagreement of individual vision in modern society, which implies differences in objectivity (Gaus 2016, 2011a; Muldoon 2017; Moehler 2014, 2015, forthcoming) or because this approach corresponds to the most advanced theories of rational choice in the social sciences (Binmore 2005, Buchanan 2000 [1975]). In any case, individuals` reasons for accepting certain rules or principles, in particular their own reasons, are not “good reasons” from an impartial point of view. Of course, the same individuals may be concerned about what they perceive as the impartial good or another non-individualistic conception – they do not need to be selfish – but what is important to them, and so their reasons will be different. This point, as Rawls points out in his later work, is essential for understanding political justification in a diverse society where members of a society cannot reasonably be expected to have similar ideas about the good (Rawls 1996). The latest contractual relationships place even more emphasis on heterogeneity (Southwood 2010, Gaus 2016, Muldoon 2017, Moehler in preparation, Thrasher 2014b, Thrasher and Vallier 2015, Thrasher 2015). The central idea of social contract theories, as we have pointed out, is that counsel to the parties must model the legitimate problem of “you and me.” This now leads to theories of the social contract in two opposite directions. On the one hand, for the deliberations of the hypothetical parties to model our problem and for their conclusions to be relevant to us, the parties must be like us. . . .